

# Blind Attacks on Machine Learners

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# Motivation

- Context: data injection attack (adversarial data added to existing distribution)
- Past work assumes attacker has knowledge of learner's algorithm (or can query for it)
- Here, consider both informed and blind attacker
- Statistical privacy - users may want to protect data via noise
- Objective: adversary makes it difficult to estimate distr. params

Distribution of interest:  $F_\theta \rightarrow$  density  $f_\theta$ , family  $\mathcal{F}$ , data  $X_i$

Malicious distribution:  $G_\phi \rightarrow$  density  $g_\phi$ , family  $\mathcal{G}$ , data  $X'_i$

Combined dataset:  $Z$ , distribution  $P$

$$p(z) = \alpha f_\theta(z) + (1 - \alpha)g_\phi(z)$$

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Minimax risk - worst-case bound on population risk of estimator:

$$\mathcal{M}_n = \inf_{\hat{\psi}} \sup_{\psi \in \Psi} \mathbb{E}_{Z_{1:n} \sim P_{\psi}^n} L(\psi, \hat{\psi}_n)$$

Intuitively: minimum worst-case risk = minimum worst-case expected  $\ell_2$ -norm

*KL*-Divergence - deviation between two distributions

Mutual information  $I(Z, V)$  - measure of dependence between random variables

Le Cam:

$$\mathcal{M}_n \geq L(\psi_1, \psi_2) \left[ \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2\sqrt{2}} \sqrt{n D_{KL}(P_{\phi_1}, P_{\phi_2})} \right]$$

Fano:

$$\mathcal{M}_n \geq \delta \left[ 1 - \frac{I(Z_{1:n}; V) + \log 2}{\log |\mathcal{V}|} \right]$$

$I(Z, V)$  upper-bounded by  $D_{KL}$



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# Blind Attacker, Informed Learner

Attacker knows  $\mathcal{F}$  but not  $F_\theta$ , learner knows  $G_\phi$

Objective: maximize  $\mathcal{M}_n$  by choice of  $G_\phi$

$$\phi^* = \operatorname{argmax}_\phi \mathcal{M}_n = \operatorname{argmax}_\phi \inf_{\hat{\psi}} \sup_{\psi \in \Psi} \mathbb{E}_{Z_{1:n} \sim P_\psi^n} L(\psi, \hat{\psi}_n)$$

Minimize KL-Divergence

$$\hat{\phi} = \operatorname{argmin}_\phi \sum_{\theta_i \in \mathcal{V}} \sum_{\theta_j \in \mathcal{V}} D_{KL}(P_{\theta_i, \phi} \| P_{\theta_j, \phi}) \geq \frac{|\mathcal{V}|^2}{n} I(Z^n; \theta)$$

# Blind Attacker, Blind Learner

Learner does not know  $G_\phi$ , but knows  $\mathcal{G}$

$$\mathcal{G}^* = \underset{\hat{\theta}}{\operatorname{argmax}} \inf_{(F_\theta, G_\phi) \in \mathcal{F} \times \mathcal{G}} \sup \mathbb{E}_{Z_{1:n}} L(\theta, \hat{\theta})$$

$$\hat{\mathcal{G}} = \underset{\mathcal{G}}{\operatorname{argmin}} \sum_{(\theta_i, \phi_i) \in \mathcal{V}} \sum_{(\theta_j, \phi_j) \in \mathcal{V}} D_{KL}(P_{\theta_i, \phi_i} \| P_{\theta_j, \phi_j}) \geq \frac{|\mathcal{V}|^2}{n} I(Z^n; \theta)$$

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$$D_{KL}(P_i \| P_j) + D_{KL}(P_j \| P_i) \leq \frac{\alpha^2}{(1-\alpha)} \|F_i - F_j\|_{TV}^2 \text{Vol}(\mathcal{Z})$$

Le Cam bound:

$$\mathcal{M}_n \geq L(\theta_1, \theta_2) \left( \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2\sqrt{2}} \sqrt{\frac{\alpha^2}{(1-\alpha)} n \|F_1 - F_2\|_{TV}^2 \text{Vol}(\mathcal{Z})} \right)$$

Fano bound:

$$\mathcal{M}_n \geq \delta \left( 1 - \frac{\frac{\alpha^2}{(1-\alpha)} \text{Vol}(\mathcal{Z}) n \tau \delta + \log 2}{\log |\mathcal{V}|} \right)$$

Uniform attack bounds effective sample size at  $n \frac{\alpha^2}{(1-\alpha)} \text{Vol}(\mathcal{Z})$

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For  $\alpha \leq \frac{1}{2}$  - attacker can make learning impossible (KL-divergences sum to 0)

Mimic attack: ( $G_\phi = F_\theta$ )

$$D_{KL}(P_i || P_j) + D_{KL}(P_j || P_i) \leq \frac{(2\alpha - 1)^2}{(1 - \alpha)} \|F_i - F_j\|_{TV}^2 \leq 4 \frac{\alpha^4}{1 - \alpha} \|F_1 - F_2\|_{TV}^2$$

KL-divergence  $\rightarrow 0$  as  $\alpha \rightarrow \frac{1}{2}$

# Summary

- Injection attacks against ML models
- 2 cases: blind learner, informed learner (attacker always blind)
- 2 attacks: uniform injection, mimic
- Attacker maximizes lower bounds on minimax risk